Come on hackers... Be ready with proof!
Why non-disclosure isn't just security theater—it's a fundamental defensive advantage in the eternal game of exploitation vs protection
In May 2024, we issued an unprecedented challenge to the global offensive security community: "Break Karma, if you can." We published a cryptographic hash of Karma's protection mechanisms—freezing our code in time—and invited threat actors, penetration testers, and post-exploitation framework developers to prove they could bypass it.
The challenge ran for nearly a month. Despite targeting some of the most sophisticated offensive tools in existence—Cobalt Strike, Brute Ratel C4, Sliver, Havoc C2, Nighthawk, and others—no one provided validated proof of bypass.
This blog explores what happened, why it matters, and what this reveals about the fundamental dynamics of offensive vs defensive security.
Modern cyberattacks follow a predictable pattern: initial compromise, followed by post-exploitation using sophisticated command-and-control (C2) frameworks. These frameworks have become the standard playbook for everyone from nation-state actors to ransomware gangs.
Framework | Key Features | Primary Users |
---|---|---|
Cobalt Strike | Malleable C2, Beacon implants, sleep obfuscation, process injection | Red teams, ransomware gangs |
Brute Ratel C4 | Anti-EDR focus, heap/stack encryption, HTTPS/DNS channels | APTs, sophisticated attackers |
Sliver | Open-source, mTLS/WireGuard transport, DLL injection | Red teams, budget-conscious threats |
Havoc C2 | Modern UI, indirect syscalls, sleep obfuscation, BOFs | Emerging threat actors |
Nighthawk | Commercial grade, advanced OPSEC, obfuscated memory | Professional red teams |
Shellter Pro | Payload obfuscation, AV evasion, polymorphic encoding | Malware developers |
These frameworks compete on their ability to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems. Marketing materials proudly claim:
The problem? They're usually right. Traditional EDR relies on signatures, behavioral heuristics, and API hooking—all of which can be circumvented with sufficient sophistication.
How offensive framework vendors typically "prove" EDR evasion:
The result: EDR vendors scramble to patch, while offensive tool developers already have the next evasion ready. The cycle repeats, with defenders always one step behind.
What's missing? Independent validation. These "proofs" are self-reported, often conducted on the attacker's infrastructure, with no third-party verification. The defensive vendor rarely even knows about the test until the public announcement.
Karma takes a fundamentally different approach. Rather than chasing signatures or behaviors, we employ structural defenses that operate at the exploitation primitive level—making entire classes of attacks mechanically fail regardless of obfuscation.
Traditional security through obscurity is rightfully criticized when it's the only defense. But when combined with structural protections, information asymmetry becomes a force multiplier:
Aspect | Public Disclosure Model | Karma's Model |
---|---|---|
Attacker knowledge | Complete—code is public | Limited—techniques unknown |
Time to develop bypass | Days—analyze code directly | Weeks/months—reverse engineer |
Testing environment | Attacker-controlled lab | Must compromise real target |
Cost to bypass | Low—public knowledge | High—requires research |
Scalability of bypass | High—share with community | Low—custom per defense |
The key insight: Making attackers work harder to develop bypasses fundamentally changes the economics of cyber attacks. When bypass development is expensive and time-consuming, only the most valuable targets justify the effort.
While we can't disclose the exact mechanisms under NDA, we can explain the philosophy:
// Traditional EDR approach: IF shellcode_pattern_detected THEN block → Attacker obfuscates pattern, bypasses detection // Karma approach: shellcode_primitive = allocate_executable_memory() → BLOCKED AT STRUCTURAL LEVEL → Doesn't matter what the shellcode looks like → Can't obfuscate away the need for executable memory // Result: Attack fails mechanically, not heuristically
This is analogous to how ASLR and DEP work—they don't detect exploits, they make entire classes of exploits structurally impossible. Karma extends this philosophy to modern post-exploitation techniques.
On May 19, 2024, we took an unusual step: we challenged the offensive security community to prove they could bypass Karma.
What we did:
What we claimed:
What we required:
Targeted frameworks:
Publishing the hash was crucial. It meant:
// Cryptographic hash published May 19, 2024 SHA-256(karma_protection_code) = [hash_value_published] // What this proves: 1. Code is frozen at this point in time 2. Any changes would produce a different hash 3. We can't secretly update to counter specific attacks 4. Third parties can verify the hash hasn't changed 5. After challenge ends, hash can prove code state // What attackers could do: - Test against Karma freely - Develop bypasses with certainty we won't adapt mid-test - Publish their success without fear of post-hoc changes - Prove we're "cheating" if hash changes
This addressed the core criticism of security testing: vendors who change their code after seeing attack techniques. The hash made that impossible—any code change would be immediately detectable.
It's important to understand what this challenge did and didn't prove:
✅ What It Proved | ❌ What It Didn't Prove |
---|---|
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The challenge generated significant discussion in the offensive security community:
Metric | Result |
---|---|
Challenge duration | 23 days (May 19 - June 11, 2024) |
Public claims of bypass | Several (unspecified number) |
Validated bypass proofs submitted | 0 |
Third-party verification | None provided |
Framework vendors who participated | None publicly confirmed |
Key Observation:
While several individuals claimed to have bypassed Karma, none provided the verifiable proof we requested. This stands in stark contrast to how offensive framework vendors typically "prove" EDR bypasses—with screenshots, videos, and detailed write-ups.
Several factors likely contributed to the absence of validated bypass proofs:
Proving a bypass requires:
This is fundamentally different from offensive tool vendors requesting evaluation devices. We didn't send out Karma-protected systems for attackers to test against at their leisure.
Developing a bypass without knowing the defense mechanisms is significantly harder:
// Against public EDR (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, etc.): 1. Download trial or get evaluation device 2. Reverse engineer the agent 3. Identify hooks and monitoring points 4. Develop bypass techniques 5. Test locally until successful 6. Publish proof TIME: Days to weeks COST: Low (mostly time) // Against non-disclosed defense (Karma): 1. Need access to protected system 2. Can't reverse engineer without access 3. Don't know what's being monitored 4. Must blindly try techniques 5. Each test risks detection 6. Can't validate locally 7. Must prove publicly (exposes method) TIME: Weeks to months COST: High (requires resources + risk)
For offensive framework vendors, bypassing Karma presented an unusual cost-benefit calculation:
Consideration | Analysis |
---|---|
Market size | Karma-X has limited market share compared to CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, etc. |
Marketing value | Bypassing a major EDR vendor is great marketing; bypassing a smaller player less so |
Development cost | Higher than normal due to non-disclosure and lack of test environment |
Exposure risk | Must publicly disclose technique to prove bypass, enabling defenses |
ROI | Low: High cost, moderate marketing value, technique disclosure required |
The bottom line: It simply wasn't worth the effort for most offensive tool vendors. This isn't a failure on their part—it's rational economics. Why invest weeks of development to bypass a system with limited deployment when you could spend that time on more valuable targets?
And that's exactly our point: Information asymmetry changes the attacker's cost-benefit calculation, making your organization a less attractive target.
On June 11, 2024, we withdrew the challenge as we began disclosing more technical details about Karma's operation. This disclosure was always the plan—transparency with customers requires sharing implementation details.
As of June 11, 2024:
The folks who publicly challenged us never provided any means to validate their claims. Now that a reasonable time has expired, we are withdrawing this challenge.
As we are disclosing more about our platform, it will of course be easier to find workarounds or bypasses—that is the nature of information asymmetry that non-disclosure provides.
The point is that non-disclosure has its advantages, and security is a brinksmanship game.
We are committed to bringing cutting-edge defense, from now into the future, that is hard to bypass. Will there be some things after full inspection of our code that can disable or bypass us? Yes, we acknowledge many things, but first and foremost we acknowledge that we don't and cannot control every aspect of every system we protect.
For the things we can control? You can count on cutting-edge protection over and above our competitors.
Security isn't a static state—it's an ongoing game of brinksmanship between offense and defense. The question isn't "Can attackers eventually bypass this?" but rather "How much will it cost them, and how long will it take?"
Attacker Type | Capabilities | Public EDR | Karma-X |
---|---|---|---|
Script Kiddies | Use public tools, no customization | ✅ Blocked | ✅ Blocked |
Commodity Criminals | Minor tool customization, public bypasses | ❌ Often bypassed | ✅ Blocked |
Sophisticated Gangs | Custom tools, known EDR bypasses | ❌ Frequently bypassed | ✅ Usually blocked |
APT Groups | Target-specific research, custom exploits | ❌ Regularly bypassed | ⚠️ Significantly harder |
Nation-States | Unlimited resources, zero-days, months of research | ❌ Bypassed with effort | ⚠️ Eventually bypassed |
The goal isn't to stop nation-state actors (though Karma makes their job harder). The goal is to stop the 99% of attacks that come from less sophisticated adversaries who can't or won't invest months developing custom bypasses.
Every additional hour of development time, every additional dollar of research cost, and every additional risk of exposure makes your organization less attractive as a target:
// Attacker decision tree: Target A (Traditional EDR): - Known bypass techniques: ✅ - Development time: 2-3 days - Success probability: 85% - Cost: $5,000 in labor → ATTRACTIVE TARGET Target B (Karma-X protected): - Known bypass techniques: ❌ - Development time: 6-8 weeks (maybe) - Success probability: Unknown (30%? 50%?) - Cost: $50,000+ in labor → UNATTRACTIVE TARGET // Result: Attacker chooses Target A Your organization survives not by being impenetrable, but by being less attractive than alternatives
As of this writing, we're transitioning from complete non-disclosure to balanced disclosure:
Why this balance? Customers need to understand how Karma works to trust it and integrate it effectively. But full disclosure would make bypass development trivial, negating the information asymmetry advantage.
We commit to:
For the things we can control—and we acknowledge we cannot control everything—you can count on cutting-edge protection over and above our competitors.
The "Proof of Protection" challenge wasn't about proving Karma is perfect. It was about demonstrating that information asymmetry, combined with structural defenses, provides measurable security value.
What we proved:
What we acknowledge:
What this means for you:
See what attackers struggled to bypass.
Karma-X combines structural defenses with information asymmetry to provide protection that makes your organization an unattractive target for all but the most sophisticated adversaries.
Start Free:
Enterprise Solutions:
From small business to enterprise, Karma-X installs simply and immediately adds peace of mind. Karma-X doesn't interfere with other software, only malware and exploits, due to its unique design.
Whether adversary nation or criminal actors, Karma-X significantly reduces exploitation risk of any organization. Update to deploy new defensive techniques to suit your organization's needs as they are offered.
Security is a game of brinksmanship. Make your organization the harder target.
Learn more: Karma-X Home | Security Blog | Contact Us
The Bottom Line: In May 2024, Karma-X challenged the world's hackers to break our protection. We published proof we wouldn't change our code, and nobody could prove they succeeded. This demonstrated that keeping security details secret—when combined with strong defenses—makes attacks much harder and more expensive for hackers.
We issued an open challenge to anyone in the world: "Try to hack a system protected by Karma, and prove you succeeded."
Why this was unusual: Most security companies test in secret. We did the opposite—we invited public testing and published a "fingerprint" (cryptographic hash) of our code to prove we wouldn't cheat by changing it mid-challenge.
Who we challenged: Developers of the most sophisticated hacking tools used by cybercriminals and nation-states:
Here's how hacking tool companies typically "prove" they can bypass security software:
The problems with this:
Instead of sending out test devices for attackers to experiment with privately, we said:
What we offered:
What we required for proof:
Duration: May 19 - June 11, 2024 (23 days)
Think of a cryptographic hash like a unique fingerprint for computer code:
Analogy | What It Means |
---|---|
Your fingerprint uniquely identifies you | The hash uniquely identifies our code |
Change anything about you → different fingerprint | Change even one letter of code → completely different hash |
Anyone can verify your fingerprint matches | Anyone can verify our code hasn't changed |
Why this matters: It proved we couldn't secretly update our defenses after seeing what attackers tried. We were locked into the code we had on day one. This addressed the main criticism of security testing—that vendors "cheat" by adapting after seeing attacks.
Metric | Result |
---|---|
People who claimed they could bypass Karma | Several |
People who provided proof of their bypass | ZERO |
Hacking tool vendors who participated | None confirmed |
Validated bypass techniques | ZERO |
What this means: While several people claimed they bypassed Karma, none provided the proof we required. This is very different from how hacking tool vendors typically operate—they usually publish screenshots, videos, and detailed write-ups when they succeed.
Several reasons made this challenge much harder than normal security testing:
Normal testing: Hacker gets a test device, works on it privately for weeks, tries unlimited techniques until something works.
Our challenge: No test devices provided. Attackers would need to compromise a real Karma-protected system to test their techniques.
Aspect | Against Public Security Software | Against Karma (Secret) |
---|---|---|
Know what it's watching | Yes—study the code | No—it's secret |
Test locally | Yes—get trial version | No—need real target |
Time to develop bypass | Days to weeks | Weeks to months |
Cost | Low (mostly time) | High (time + resources + risk) |
For hacking tool companies, bypassing Karma wasn't worth the investment:
The calculation: Why spend weeks/months and $50,000+ to bypass Karma when you could spend days and $5,000 to bypass a major EDR vendor with 100x the market share?
And that's exactly the point: By making bypass development expensive and difficult, we make your organization a less attractive target. Attackers choose easier victims.
It's crucial to be clear about what this challenge did and didn't prove:
❌ We're NOT Saying | ✅ We ARE Saying |
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On June 11, 2024—after 23 days—we withdrew the challenge. Here's why:
Security isn't about being impenetrable—it's about being harder to attack than alternatives.
Imagine you're a cybercriminal choosing between two companies to attack:
Factor | Company A (Traditional Security) | Company B (Karma-X) |
---|---|---|
Known bypass techniques? | ✅ Yes, public knowledge | ❌ No, need research |
Time to develop attack | 2-3 days | 6-8 weeks (maybe) |
Success probability | 85% | 30-50% (unknown) |
Cost in labor | $5,000 | $50,000+ |
Attacker's Choice | TARGET THIS ONE → | ← Too expensive |
You survive not by being impenetrable, but by being more expensive to attack than your competitors.
Different attackers have different capabilities:
Attacker Type | Examples | Can They Bypass Karma? |
---|---|---|
Script Kiddies | Use downloaded hacking tools with no modifications | ❌ No |
Commodity Criminals | Ransomware gangs, most cybercriminals | ❌ Usually no |
Sophisticated Groups | Well-funded criminal organizations | ⚠️ Significantly harder |
APT Groups | Advanced persistent threat actors with resources | ⚠️ Possible with effort |
Nation-States | Government-sponsored hackers with unlimited budgets | ⚠️ Eventually, yes |
The reality: Karma stops 99% of attacks. The remaining 1% are nation-state level threats that most organizations don't face. And even for those attackers, Karma makes their job significantly harder and more expensive.
Q: If nobody bypassed Karma, does that mean it's perfect?
A: No. It means that during those 23 days, with the code frozen, attackers either couldn't figure out a bypass or chose not to invest the resources. Security is never perfect—it's about raising the bar high enough that most attackers give up.
Q: What about nation-state hackers with unlimited budgets?
A: Eventually, with enough time and resources, sophisticated attackers could likely develop bypasses. But that's true for any security system. The key is that Karma stops the 99% of attacks from less sophisticated actors.
Q: If you're sharing more details now, won't that make bypasses easier?
A: Yes, disclosure does reduce the information asymmetry advantage—that's inevitable. But we're using balanced disclosure (sharing what customers need under NDA while keeping critical details secret) and continuously developing new techniques to stay ahead.
Q: How is this different from "security through obscurity" which everyone says is bad?
A: Security through obscurity means secrecy is your ONLY defense. That's bad. Karma uses strong structural defenses PLUS information asymmetry. The combination is much more powerful than either alone.
Q: Why should I trust claims without seeing the code?
A: Fair question. We offer:
Q: What happens when someone eventually does bypass Karma?
A: We'll patch it quickly and develop new techniques. Security is an ongoing arms race, not a solved problem. The question isn't "if" but "how long does it take" and "how expensive is it."
The "Proof of Protection" challenge wasn't about claiming perfection. It was about demonstrating a fundamental truth: information asymmetry combined with structural defenses provides measurable security value.
What we demonstrated:
What you get with Karma-X:
See what attackers struggled to bypass. Try Karma-X protection for yourself:
Start Free:
For Businesses:
Security isn't about being impenetrable—it's about being harder to attack than alternatives. Make your organization the one hackers skip because it's too expensive and too difficult.
That's not theory. That's what our challenge demonstrated.
Security is an economic game. Win by changing the attacker's cost-benefit calculation.
Learn more: Karma-X Home | Security Blog | Contact Us
From small business to enterprise, Karma-X installs simply and immediately adds peace of mind
Karma-X doesn't interfere with other software, only malware and exploits, due to its unique design.
Whether adversary nation or criminal actors, Karma-X significantly reduces exploitation risk of any organization
Update to deploy new defensive techniques to suit your organization's needs as they are offered